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I. INTRODUCTION

There is no decision more important in a democracy than the popular
election of the president. As straightforward as it is to state this
proposition, we all understand that the actual ways and means of
presidential elections are far more complex than any simple statement.
Recent presidential elections in Peru, Costa Rica, and the United States
have featured interesting contests and interplay between, or among, the
executive and judicial branches of government, and between these
branches and the populace these branches are meant to serve.
In this Essay, I describe and analyze the role ofjudicial review in three
relatively recent bids for presidential election or reelection. In 1996-97, the
Peruvian Constitutional Court attempted unsuccessfully to exercise judicial
review in a way that would have prevented then-President Fujimori from
running for reelection. In 2003, the Sala Constitucional de la Corte
Suprema de Justicia (Sala IV), ruled that a constitutional provision
prohibiting the reelection of a former president was unconstitutional,
therefore paving the way for Oscar Arias's recent, successful run for
reelection as President of Costa Rica. And in 2000, the U.S. Supreme
Court intervened in the election for U.S. President and effectively decided
that George W. Bush won an extremely close election. These very different
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cases teach some interesting lessons about, on the one hand, the need for
effective judicial review and, on the other, the need for limits on judicial
review in democracies.
II. PERU
In the Constitutional Court Case, decided January 31, 2001, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights finally resolved the Peruvian
constitutional crisis of 1997-a crisis that resulted in the impeachment and
harassment of three Justices of the Peruvian Constitutional Court.1 The
Peruvian case teaches lessons about the necessity for binding, final judicial
review at the international level when respect for judicial independence
and authority is low within a nation.
While the full procedural background and facts of the case are too
complex to recount here, its basic elements are fairly straightforward.
Alberto Fujimori was elected President of Peru in 1990. In 1992, President
Fujimori dissolved the Congress, the Court of Constitutional Guarantees,
and dismissed many of the justices of the Supreme Court. In 1993, a new
Constitution was adopted. Article 112 of the new Constitution provided
that a sitting President was immediately eligible for reelection for a single
five-year term, then again eligible for reelection after a five-year hiatus.2
In 1996, a new Constitutional Court was appointed.
Also in 1996, the Legislature passed the Law on Authentic
Interpretation of Article 112 of the Constitution.' The language of this
statute seemed to make President Fujimori eligible for reelection. A
lawsuit was filed claiming that the statute conflicted with Article 112 and
was therefore unconstitutional. In December 1996 and January 1997, after
internal struggle on the Court regarding the judgment to be reached, three
justices decided, with four abstentions, that the statute was not applicable
to President Fujimori's situation, and, therefore, Fujimori was ineligible to
run for reelection.4 Under the Constitutional Court's rules, ajudgment that
the statute was not applicable could appropriately be reached by a simple
majority of the justices voting.5

1. Constitutional Court Case, Judgment of Jan. 31,2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No.
71 (2001).
2. Const. Court Case, para. 56.1.
3. Id. para. 56.4.
4. Const. Court Case, Competence, Judgment of Sept. 24, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 55 para. 2(e)-(I) (1999).
5. Also under the Constitutional Court's rules, ajudgment ofunconstitutionality, as opposed
to a judgment of inapplicability, would have required a supermajority of six of the seven sitting
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The decision of these three justices of the Constitutional Court, if
adhered to, would have rendered Fujimori ineligible to run for reelection.
In response to this judgment, the Peruvian legislature commenced a series
of actions hostile to the deciding justices. These actions culminated in the
impeachment of the three justices who decided the case, in addition to
other forms of harassment. One of the justices, Delia Revoredo Marsano,
sought and received exile in Costa Rica.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights subsequently filed
a petition against Peru in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.6 The
petition sought to challenge the impeachment and harassment of the three
justices as violations of the American Convention on Human Rights
(Convention). In the Constitutional Court Case, the Court decided that
Peru violated rights of the impeached justices guaranteed by the
Convention.7 The Court decided that Peru had violated the impeached
justices' rights to a fair trial guaranteed under Articles 8(1) and 8(2) of the
Convention.8 In particular, the hurried impeachment proceedings violated
the justices' due process rights and rights to present a meaningful defense
against the offenses alleged against them.9 The Court also concluded that
Peru's failure to provide adequate judicial recourse to the impeached
justices violated Article 25 of the Convention."° In addition, the violations
of Articles 8 and 25 also constituted violations of Article 1(1) of the
Convention, which states the obligation of signatory states to respect the
rights and freedoms stated in the Convention."
The Court's reasoning with respect to Peru's violations of Article 8
emphasized the importance ofjudicial independence:
This Court considers that one of the principal purposes of the
separation of public powers is to guarantee the independence ofjudges
and, to this end, the different political systems have conceived strict
procedures for both their appointment and removal .... This Court
considers that, under the rule of law, the independence of all judges
must be guaranteed and, in particular, that of constitutional judges,
owing to the nature of the matters submitted to their consideration. As
the European Court has indicated, the independence of any judge

justices. Const. Court Case, Competence, para. 2(f).
6. Const. Court Case, para. 1.
7. Id. para. 130.
8. Id.
9. Id. para. 83.
10. Id. paras. 96, 97.
11. Const. Court Case, paras. 110, 113.
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presumes that there is an appropriate appointment process, 12a fixed term
in the position, and a guarantee against external pressure.
These events in Peru, and the subsequent decision by the InterAmerican Court, demonstrate the importance ofjudicial independence and
binding judicial review as the only effective checks on unbridled executive
and legislative power. During the time of these events, a weak judiciary
with unenforceable judicial review was not able to check President
Fujimori's will to power. When the judiciary is weak domestically and its
judgments are not honored by the other branches of government, then
effective judicial review must come from outside the nation. In this case,
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights asserted jurisdiction and was
able to make a decision vindicating the impeached justices' rights and
vindicating important principles of judicial independence and freedom
from external pressure. Had there been no international court with
jurisdiction, or had the Peruvian government not abided by the decision of
the Court, there would have been no check on executive or legislative
authority.
III. COSTA RICA
In Costa Rica, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia,
the Constitutional Court known as Sala IV, decided in 2003 that Article
132 of the Constitucion Politica was unconstitutional. Article 132, as
modified by ordinary legislation in July 1969, prohibited former presidents
of Costa Rica from running for reelection. Sala IV declared that this
modification of the Costa Rican Constitution violated the Constitution for
several reasons. First, the reelection ban was contrary to a long-established
constitutional tradition in Costa Rica permitting reelection.13 Second, the
ban on reelection violated fundamental rights of Costa Ricans to vote for
their candidates of choice and to run for elective office.' 4 These

fundamental rights of Costa Ricans are also guaranteed in Article 23 of the
American Convention on Human Rights. 5 Third, the principle of
constitutional supremacy, according to Sala IV, properly limits the ability
of the legislature to amend constitutional provisions in a way that abridges

12. Id. paras. 73, 75 (footnotes omitted).
13. Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Exp. 02-005494-0007-CO, Res:
2003-02771, § V (Apr. 4, 2003).
14. Id. § VI.
15. Id. § VI-D.
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the fundamental rights of Costa Ricans. 6 Lastly, an amendment abridging
the fundamental rights of Costa Ricans can only be accomplished through
a full Constitutional Assembly, not through an ordinary act of the
Legislative Assembly. 7
The Court's first argument was to establish that amended Article 132
was contrary to Costa Rican constitutional tradition. After a lengthy review
of Costa Rican history with respect to reelection, the Court reached the
following conclusions:
la tradicion constitucional costarricense es, definitivamente,
proclive a la reserva de toda reforma relativa a la reeleccion
presidencial al poder originario. Esta tradicion se instala con la
independencia [en 1821 ], se ve confirmada desde la fundacion de la
Republica y se mantiene inalterada durante ciento ochenta y ocho
anos.
Only in 1967-69, when Article 132 was modified to prohibit reelection,
was this tradition broken.
Second, the attempted modification of Article 132 abridged important
fundamental rights of Costa Rican citizens. The Court described, and
enforced, a fundamental right of citizens to vote for their candidate of
choice:
El derecho de eleccion, como derecho politico, tambien constituye
un derecho humano de primer orden, y por ende, es un derecho
fundamental. La reeleccion

.

.

.

estaba contemplada en la

Constitucion Politica de 1949 y constituye una garantia del derecho
de eleccion, pues le permite al ciudadano tener la facultad de
escoger, en una mayor amplitud de posibilidades, los gobemantes
que estima convenientes.
Relying on Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights,
the Sala Constitucional also suggested a fundamental right on the part of
Costa Rican citizens to run for election. Article 23 provides that "Todos los
ciudadanos deben gozar de los siguientes derechos y oportunidades
[incluyendo los derechos] de votar y ser elegidos en elecciones periodicas
autenticas."' 8 According to Article 23, these rights exist without limitations
other than lawful restrictions based on age, nationality, residence,
16. Id. § VIII.
17. Id. § IX.
18. Id.art. 23 (1).
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language, education, mental or civil capacity, or criminal conviction. 9
Since Costa Rica bound itself to this Convention, the Court concluded that
the legislature violated the fundamental rights of Costa Ricans by limiting
eligibility for reelection for reasons other than those recognized as
legitimate in Article 23. The Court described these fundamental rights as
essential to the basic principles of democracy and popular sovereignty.
Furthermore, the Court described other important principles vindicated by
enforcement of these fundamental rights: prevention of arbitrariness;
enforcement of the Constitution as a limitation on governmental power;
enforcement of the equality of individuals under the Constitution;
enforcement ofjudicial stability; and enforcement of the supremacy of the
Constitution over conflicting legislation.
The Court described important principles of constitutional supremacy
that limit the legislature's ability to amend constitutional provisions in a
way that abridges the fundamental rights of Costa Ricans.2" The Court
described the unique and supreme nature of a Constitution: "No es lo
mismo establecer una Constitucion que reformarla, pues lo primero es un
acto de maxima soberania popular, un acto creador; es la facultad soberana
del pueblo para darse su propio ordenamiento juridico-politico."' 2
Accordingly, constitutional norms protecting fundamental rights can only
be abridged by a constituent, constitutional assembly as provided under
Article 196 of the Costa Rican Constitucion Politica. While the Court
concluded that the Legislature was unable to limit or curtail fundamental
rights under ordinary legislative processes, the Court noted that the
legislature retained the ability to enhance or enlarge the civil rights of
citizens, because enhancing the scope of fundamental rights did not
threaten the destruction of the basic fundamental rights implied in the
original, organic Constitution ("el poder constituyente originario"):
Estos derechos pueden ser objeto de reforma parcial, unicamente
cuando se trate de modificaciones positivas, que son aquellas que
amplian los contenidos de los derechos ciudadanos-particularmente
el de libertad-por la Asamblea Legislativa . .

.

. Es decir, la

Asamblea Legislativa puede ampliar los contenidos y alcances de
los derechos fundamentales, pero no puede el poder constituyente
derivado suprimir o reducir tales contenidos, pues de esta forma

19. Id.art. 23 (2).

20. Id.§ VIII.
21. Id.§ VII.
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podria destruir el orden basico instituido por el poder constituyente
originario.22
The Sala Constitucional, in holding that a Legislative restriction on the
reelection of a former president violated the original Constitution, invoked
many of the same arguments for binding judicial review as advanced by
Chief Justice Marshall in Marburyv. Madison,23 the early Supreme Court
decision establishing judicial review in the United States. In addition, the
Court used other conceptual and rhetorical strategies similar to those used
by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Sala Constitucional invalidated legislative
action that curtailed the fundamental rights of Costa Ricans, as defined and
described by the Court. In identifying fundamental rights to elect one's
candidate of choice and to run for election, the Sala Constitucional used
strategies similar to those of the U.S. Supreme Court in identifying
fundamental rights. The Sala Constitucional relied on Costa Rican history
and tradition in identifying the continuous importance of reelection as a
constitutional value. The Sala constitucional also relied on explicit
statements of these rights in the American Declaration of Human Rights.
In the United States, by contrast, it remains very controversial to refer to
international norms of Human Rights as sources of values to be enforced
in U.S. constitutional law.24
The reasoning of Sala IV was grounded in fundamental rights of the
people to have access to a greater range of candidates. The Court thus
supported and amplified democracy by enlarging the range of possible
candidates. This kind of democracy-enhancing judicial review stands in
marked contrast to the use ofjudicial review by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Bush v. Gore.25
22. In articulating the principle that the Legislature retained power to enhance or enlarge, but
not to curtail, the fundamental rights of Costa Ricans, the Sala Constitucional applied a principle
articulated in U.S. constitutional law in the case of Katzenbach v. Morgan. 344 U.S. 641 (1966).
In Katzenbach, Justice Brennan described the "ratchet effect," under which the legislature could
enlarge the meaning of equal protection under its powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but that such a power to enlarge did not include a power to diminish the meaning of
equal protection. Id. at 648-49. The Supreme Court, under Katzenbach, would retain power to
prevent the legislature from diminishing equal protection rights. Interestingly, the current U.S.
Supreme Court has restricted legislative power under section 5 and under the commerce clause
dramatically, such that the Congress can only act in a narrow remedial fashion, largely dependent
on preceding decisions of the Supreme Court.
23. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
24. A. Scalia, Assoc. J. U.S. S. Ct. & S. Breyer, Assoc. J. U.S. S. Ct., U.S. Ass'n of Const.
L. Discussion: Const. Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions (Jan. 13, 2005) (transcript available
at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/I 352357/posts).
25. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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IV. THE UNITED STATES
If the recent decision of Sala IV illustrates how judicial review can
support fuller democracy in Costa Rica, then Bush v. Gore illustrates the
more troubling possibility ofjudicial review interfering in democracy. The
Court's controversial decision and the reasons for its decision had the
potential to raise serious questions about the Court's legitimacy. The Court
violated several important doctrines and even circumvented federal law in
deciding the case. While these questions and issues have certainly been
raised by scholars of constitutional law, the Court's intrusive foray into the
U.S. political process has not eroded the Court's legitimacy in the least.
One could conclude that in the United States the Supreme Court may be
too powerful, receiving too much deference from the public and from the
executive and legislative branches of government.
In Bush v. Gore, the U.S. Supreme Court effectively decided the
outcome of the 2000 presidential election in favor of George W. Bush. In
effect, there was a statistical tie between Al Gore and George W. Bush in
Florida, whose electoral votes would determine the winner of the election.
The Supreme Court's decision, which halted the manual counting of
ballots previously unrecorded by voting machines in Florida, resulted in
the certification of the prior vote total, which narrowly favored Bush. The
Court's decision effectively ended the election with thousands of ballots
remaining uncounted and resulted in victory for President Bush.
The Supreme Court's intervention was unprecedented, extraordinarily
intrusive upon the political process, and profoundly troubling in many
respects. First, the Supreme Court actually halted the democratic process,
which it presumably sought to protect by deciding the case in the first
place. The Court interrupted and prevented a more democratic ending of
the most important decision that we make in a democracy. Actually and
symbolically, the Court stood for the proposition that certain "ballots shall
not be counted," a paradoxical and ironic result in a nation that claims
special stature as a democracy.
Secondly, strong arguments can be made that the Supreme Court lacked
jurisdiction to decide this case because the issues the Court decided were
not ripe for decision and because the question presented was a political
question.26 The conceptual heart of the per curiam opinion was that the
counting of uncounted ballots without uniform standards violated equal
protection because identical ballots might be treated and counted

26. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, How Should We Think About Bush v. Gore, 34 LOY.
U. CHi. L.J. 1 (2002).
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differently.27 The problem with this reasoning is that it was hypothetical;
the case was not ripe for decision. Because the Court halted the counting
of ballots, there were no actual instances of identical or similar ballots
treated differently under the recount procedure ordered by the Florida
Supreme Court. The recount procedure provided that a single judge would
hear and resolve all disputes arising during the ballot count.2 8 The judge
could have applied uniform standards and thus could have avoided the
potential denial of equal protection that concerned the Supreme Court.
Justice Stevens commented on this in his dissent:
the use of differing substandards for determining voter intent in
different counties employing similar voting systems may raise serious
concerns. Those concerns are alleviated-if not eliminated-by the fact
that a single impartial magistrate will ultimately adjudicate all
objections arising from the recount process.29
The fact that there was no actual instance of the harm that the Court relied
upon for its decision means that the case was not ripe for decision.
As a prudential matter as well, the Court probably should have
refrained from deciding the case because it presented a political question.3"
The political question doctrine enforces the separation of powers by
keeping the Supreme Court from deciding cases that the Constitution
commits to other branches of government. Under the political question
doctrine, the Court routinely stays out of controversies that are committed
to either the executive or legislative branches to preserve the separation of
powers. The resolution of difficult situations in the electoral process such
as arose here is committed prominently to the legislative branch.
Notwithstanding, the Court decided to hear the case, and in so doing
intruded prominently into the electoral process and halted the counting of
ballots.
The Court also acted inconsistent with the robust vision of federalism
enforced by the Rehnquist court in numerous opinions. 3' The Rehnquist
Court had been limiting the scope of federal power in the name of an
important, independent role for the states and state legislative and judicial
bodies.32 In marked contrast, the Court in Bush v. Gore repeatedly flouted

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Bush, 531 U.S. at 105-07.
Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
See Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 15-16.
See id. at 18-20.
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Gun-Fee School
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its oft-stated federalism rationales and ignored entirely the decisions and
interpretations of the Florida Supreme Court with regard to the meaning of
Florida law. For example, the Court decided that the counting of ballots
previously unrecorded by voting machines ordered by the Florida Supreme
Court could not be accomplished with appropriate standards by December
12, 2000, a date stated as a matter of Florida state law.33 There was,
however, nothing necessarily fixed about the December 12 date. This date
was named in an interpretation of Florida law by the Florida Supreme
Court,34 and the Florida Court could have either adhered to that date or
named another, had it been permitted to decide the case on remand from
the Supreme Court.
Lastly, the Supreme Court decision also circumvented the legislative
process already in place for deciding controversies such as this one. If, in
the most complex case, there had been two conflicting slates of electors
from Florida, one for Bush and one for Gore, then the decision on which
slate of electors to accept would have been made by members of the House
of Representatives and the Senate, if they agreed.35 If the House and Senate
disagreed, then the governor of Florida, Jeb Bush, would have decided,36
obviously in his brother's favor.
One can attempt to justify the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore on the
grounds of speed and certainty. The Court certainly ended promptly the
period of uncertainty about the electoral results in Florida. However,
considering that the electoral stakes could not have been higher than a
contested election for the presidency, neither speed nor finality provide
persuasive justifications for ignoring federal law and halting the counting
of ballots in a democracy.
Perhaps I have persuaded you that Bush v. Gore was a bad decision, or
at least highly problematic. Or perhaps I have demonstrated that the Court
reached intrusively into the electoral process and distorted the election of
a president. But so what? Who cares, besides a coterie of disgruntled
constitutional law professors? The sobering answer to this question seems
to be nearly no one. It is remarkable that in the United States, the Supreme
Court can intervene decisively in a presidential election and determine its
outcome with no significant repercussions. The tragic events of September

Zones Act exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause authority); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000) (holding neither the Commerce Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress
authority to enact civil remedy provision of Violence Against Women Act).
33. Bush, 531 U.S. at 110-11.
34. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000).
35. 3 U.S.C.A. § 15 (2008).
36. Id.
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11, 2001 and the ensuing war in Iraq eclipsed and silenced questions about
the legitimacy of the Bush presidency. These events probably had some
similar silencing effect on questions about the legitimacy of the Supreme
Court's role in Bush's presidency.
Notwithstanding, it remains remarkable that there was no widespread
or sustained outrage at the Supreme Court's decisive role in the Bush
presidency. National outrage could have taken several forms, none of
which materialized in any significant way. There could have been
continuing protests over the Bush presidency. There could have been
congressional efforts to impeach some of the Justices of the Supreme
Court. Given Republican control over the Congress, impeachment of
Supreme Court justices who helped install a Republican president was
unlikely politically. There could have been some amendment to the
Constitution to prevent Supreme Court interference in future elections.
While the 9/11 tragedy likely preempted national attention to any of these
possibilities, it remains noteworthy that none of these expressions of
outrage materialized significantly even prior to 9/11.
It remains remarkable that there has been no deterioration in the
Supreme Court's legitimacy, or in the perception of its legitimacy, since its
unprecedented decision in Bush v. Gore. The U.S. Supreme Court is a
remarkably powerful institution, and the public accepts its role in deciding
controversial questions, even the outcome of a presidential election. There
is great irony, in a democracy, when unelected judges decide the outcome
of a presidential election. There should also be great concern about the
social and political dynamics that allow an unchecked, and apparently
uncheckable, judiciary to make such decisions with impunity.
V. CONCLUSION

These three examples ofjudicial involvement in presidential elections
in Peru, Costa Rica, and the United States teach us important lessons about
the nature of judicial review in a democracy. The Peruvian example
illustrates the importance of judicial independence and binding judicial
review as the only effective check on potentially unbridled executive and
legislative power. In 1996-97, the Peruvian Constitutional Court was too
weak and too vulnerable to attack from a hostile legislature to provide any
check on President Fujimori's desire for continuation in power. This
Peruvian case also demonstrates the importance of an international court
with appropriate jurisdiction in the event that effective domestic judicial
review is unavailable. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was
able to exercise independent, binding judicial review and explicitly to
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support principles of judicial independence and freedom from political
pressure by deciding in favor of the three impeached justices of the
Peruvian Constitutional Court.
In Costa Rica, the decision of Sala IV to declare unconstitutional the
relatively recent prohibition on reelection of a former president illustrates
the use ofjudicial review to support and amplify democracy. The reasoning
of Sala IV, steeped in Costa Rican constitutional tradition, identified and
relied explicitly on fundamental rights of Costa Ricans to elect the
candidate oftheir choice and to run for office. By identifying and enforcing
these fundamental rights, Sala IV exercised judicial review in a way that
supported and expanded democratic possibilities.
The supportive stance of Sala IV relative to democracy in Costa Rica
stands in striking, and perhaps remarkable, contrast to the essentially antidemocratic role played by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore. The
Supreme Court, rather than allowing the counting of more votes, halted the
counting of ballots and interfered with a more democratic resolution of the
presidential election in 2000. While there are many troubling aspects of the
Bush v. Gore decision, perhaps most troubling is the disparity between
what the Court said and what it did. The Court said it was concerned about
the possibility of unequal treatment of votes under Florida standards. But
the Court actually produced unequal treatment of votes by halting the
counting of uncounted ballots altogether, rather than allowing the electoral
process to proceed under revised Florida standards. Rather than supporting
the democratic process, the Supreme Court halted it with the result still
uncertain. The unelected Court avoided, rather than engaged, more
democracy.
Remarkably, however, despite its intrusive role in the 2000 presidential
election, the Court seems to have suffered no ill effects, no diminution in
its prestige, no accountability. If the Peruvian case illustrates that a weak
judiciary with ineffective powers of judicial review is not a good thing,
then the U.S. case may illustrate that an intrusive, powerful, and essentially
unaccountable Supreme Court may also not be such a good thing.
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